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A 
 particular achievement of Greek philosophers, 
speaking in the most general sense, was an approach 
to philosophy as an integrated system of thought.  
Plato, in contrast to earlier philosophers who had fo-
cused primarily on explaining the natural world, wrote not just 
about metaphysics, or epistemology, or ethics, or politics, but 
about all of these.  Moreover, each particular subject of Plato‘s 
thought was connected to and consistent with a wider view of 
humanity and the world.  His view of the realm of Forms was 
connected to his view of how one should seek the good (as an 
entity existing in its pure form only in that realm), which was in 
turn connected to his view of how and by whom a city should be 
ruled (by those able to attain the closest knowledge of the true 
good).  This approach to philosophy as an integrated system be-
came an implicit model for philosophy.  The Hellenistic philoso-
phers who became prominent after Aristotle‘s death might ar-
guably have been concerned with a different, more individual-
ized view of philosophy than the philosophers of the Classical 
Period had been, and yet their treatment of the different 
branches of philosophy as part of an integrated system followed 
Plato‘s model.  Both Epicureanism and Stoicism, the two leading 
philosophies of the Hellenistic Period, demonstrate this integra-
tion.  The two philosophies may have held opposing conceptions 
of virtue – the Epicureans viewed virtue as a pragmatic means to 
an end; the Stoics viewed it as the end, the goal and the focus of 
living – but these two philosophies were not limited to their con-
ceptions of virtue.  Each was a cohesive, unified, philosophic sys-
tem.  A fascinating exemplification of this lies in the juxtaposi-
tion of Hellenistic metaphysical and ethical views: more particu-
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larly, in connections between a view of the gods and a view of 
virtue. 
Both Epicureanism and Stoicism drew such connections.  
Their separate conceptions of ―god‖ not only influenced, but in 
some sense necessitated their separate conceptions of virtue.  This 
is true in two ways.  The first is because followers of both phi-
losophies were advised to imitate the gods.  This principle of imi-
tation bound virtue inextricably to divine models.  The second is 
because the premise that underlies each conception of divinity 
leads, logically, to a particular view of virtue. 
 The imitation of divine models is an idea propounded by 
Stoics and Epicureans alike.  Epicurus writes, ―For the gods al-
ways welcome men who are like themselves, being congenial to 
their own virtues and considering that whatever is not such is 
uncongenial‖.  Balbus, a Roman Stoic, puts forth the same view 
according to Cicero‘s The Nature of the Gods: ―Man has emerged 
for the contemplation and imitation of the universe; though he is 
in no way perfect, in a sense he is a fragment of perfection.‖  For 
followers of both schools of thought, the concept of divine imita-
tion is an important one. 
 For the Epicureans, the model to follow consisted of a 
god detached from human affairs, detached from everything ex-
ternal to himself, floating, infinitely wise, and entirely at peace.  
Epicurus describes the god, ―First, believe that god is an inde-
structible and blessed animal…Believe of him everything which 
is able to preserve his blessedness and indestructibility.‖  Lu-
cretius elaborates, more poetically: 
 
For perfect peace gods by their very nature, 
Must of necessity enjoy, and immortal life,  
Far separate, far removed from our affairs. 
For free from every sorrow, every danger, 
Strong in their own powers, needing naught from us, 
They are not won by gifts nor touched by anger.   
 
The Epicurean god was self-contained, self-sufficient, disinter-
ested, and implacable.  He existed in a realm separate from the 
earth and enjoyed a quiet, eternally pleasant state of being. 
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 Epicurus taught an approach to morality that directly 
imitated this model.  He taught that his followers should pursue, 
above all, a state of mind free from disturbance: ―One [should] 
refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and 
the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this is the goal of 
a blessed life.‖  He taught that they should strive to remove any 
form of dependency from their lives: ―we believe that self-
sufficiency is a great good, not in order that we might make do 
with few things under all circumstances, but so that if we do not 
have a lot we can make do with few.‖  He taught them to remove 
themselves from the affairs of society: ―The purest security is that 
which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many.‖  
In short, Epicurus taught to his mortal followers the same mental 
freedom from disturbance, self-sufficiency, and removal from the 
world that he described in the immortal gods.  Epicureans 
sought to foster divine qualities within themselves. 
 The Stoics followed quite a different godly-model.  Zeno 
conceived of a god, not removed from the world system, but 
identical with it, and with the universe as a whole.  This god‘s 
distinguishing characteristic was not an emotional state (calm 
contentment), but a state of perfect, ideal rationality.  According 
to Balbus, in Cicero, ―The universe is alive, and endowed with 
consciousness, intelligence, and reason; and the logical conclu-
sion from this is that the universe is God.‖  The Stoics described 
their god not with images of lonely floating, but of fiery heat.  In 
Cicero: ―elemental heat possesses within it a life-sustaining force 
which extends throughout the whole universe,‖ and slightly 
later, ―…this hot, fiery substance percolates the whole of nature 
in such a way that it becomes both the forceful begetter and the 
cause of bringing into existence.‖  This ―fire‖, in the god, was the 
animating, life-giving quality of rationality. 
The Stoic god was not only involved with the world; he 
controlled it entirely.  He deterministically mapped out the 
movement of its every particle, and wrote the laws of both na-
ture and man.  The universe is thus described as a place of per-
fect regularity.  Balbus catalogues in depth the movements of the 
heavens, and exclaims, ―The heavens contain no chance or ran-
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dom element, no erratic or pointless movement; on the contrary, 
all is due order and integrity, reason, and regularity.‖  What is 
more, the Stoic god plans according to the interests of humanity as 
a whole: ―All that is in [the universe] has been provided and de-
vised for us to enjoy; for the universe is, so to say, the shared 
dwelling of gods and men, or a city which houses both.‖  The 
Stoic god is civic-minded. 
 There are scores of parallels in Stoicism between these 
descriptions of divinity and the Stoic injunctions for human ac-
tion.  Man, like the god, strives, under Stoicism, for perfect ra-
tionality, free from emotions that will cloud his judgment.  Plu-
tarch writes, in accordance with Stoicism, that virtue is ―a certain 
character and power of the soul‘s commanding-faculty, engen-
dered by reason, or rather, a character which is itself consistent, 
firm, and unchangeable reason,‖ and reminds that ―passion is 
vicious and uncontrolled reason which acquires vehemence and 
strength from bad and erroneous judgment.‖  The same fire of 
life and rationality which permeates the universe permeates man 
as well. 
Like the god, man is defined by an element of control – 
even in spite of fate.  ―By the work of [his] hands [man] strive[s] 
to create a sort of second nature within the world of nature.‖  
Man shapes his own life and surroundings, and in so doing 
strives for the same perfection that characterizes divinity.  A. A. 
Long describes the Stoic idea that, ―if human nature is perfectible 
nothing short of its perfection can be admissible as the ultimate 
goal,‖ and writes, ―Stoic ethics is an epitome of idealism‖.  Fi-
nally, like the god, man acts for the benefit, not just of himself, 
but of his friends, his city, of all of humanity – for the benefit of 
the afore-mentioned ―shared dwelling of gods and men‖.  The 
Stoics, according to Long, advocated, ―a communal way of life‖.  
They emphasized the importance of benefiting others, as the 
gods benefit humanity. 
Both the Stoics and Epicureans had a definite view of the 
gods that they strove to imitate in their own lives.  Yet this is not 
the only connection between conceptions of divinity and concep-
tions of virtue.  There is also a certain causal link between the 
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two.  The premises the Epicurean accepted as part of his defini-
tion of the gods led him to certain conclusions about virtue.  The 
same is true of the Stoics. 
The Epicureans, as we have seen, viewed the gods as de-
tached.  They had no role in human affairs, and so had no role in 
human virtue.  Epicurus rejected what he considered to be a false 
view of the gods as entities of justice, who would punish men for 
their wrongdoing.  Lucretius writes that humans could only have 
accepted that false view of divinity out of fear.  He writes: 
 
Let us now think why reverence for the gods 
Has spread through mighty nations and filled cities with altars…
What man does not quail with fear of the gods, 
With shrinking mind and flesh creeping with terror… 
Lest for some foul deed or contemptuous word 
The solemn hour of punishment be near. 
 
The fear Lucretius describes is the fear that the gods, as the final 
judges of virtue, will punish men for failing to be virtuous – for 
committing ―foul deeds‖. 
 Epicureanism seeks to excise this fear by denying the 
premise that has caused it – the premise that the gods are a 
source of virtue.  Instead, the Epicureans described virtue as a 
practice, which arose by convention because it prevented vio-
lence and was thus in the interest of all.  Lucretius, describing 
humanity‘s historical progression into civilization, writes: 
 
So things fell back to utter dregs and turmoil 
As every man sought power for himself. 
Then some men taught them to appoint magistrates  
With rights established and the rule of law;  
For mankind worn by a life of violence 
And weakened by its feuds, was ready now 
To yield to the rules of law and binding statutes. 
 
In this description, virtue does not arise from a divine will, but 
from a practical need.  Epicurus, by removing the fear of the 
gods as a judge of virtue, changed virtue from a divine mandate 
into a convention.  In this vein, he wrote, ―Prudence is…the 
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greatest good.  That is why prudence is a more valuable thing 
than philosophy.  For prudence is the source of all the other vir-
tues…The virtues are natural adjuncts of the pleasant life.‖  In 
other words, the virtues do not come from philosophical princi-
ples, but from simple common sense.  Virtue, with the stamp of 
divinity removed, became a pragmatic mechanism. 
 This meant that the Epicurean concept of virtue was mu-
table.  Take, for example, the virtue of justice.  Long and Sedley 
quote Epicurus: ―And even if what is useful in the sphere of jus-
tice changes but fits the preconception for some time, it was no 
less just throughout that time.‖   Also: ―Justice was never any-
thing per se, but a contract, regularly arising at some place or 
other in people‘s dealings with one another.‖  That is to say, jus-
tice has no absolute or objective nature, it is simply a ―contract‖.  
It is whatever is useful and mutually advantageous to human 
interaction in a given situation. 
 Epicurus‘ defined the gods in a particular way, and in so 
doing accepted the premise that virtue was not derived from a 
divine standard.  This led him to the view of virtue as a practical 
convention rather than an objectively defined principle.  Because 
virtue had no divine definition, it had no definition.  It changed 
depending on circumstance.  The connection between these two 
views is an instance of the way the Epicurean philosophy fit to-
gether as a system – for the purposes of our case-study, as an in-
tegration of metaphysics and ethics. 
 The Stoic philosophy was in many ways diametrically 
opposed to Epicureanism, yet Stoicism too evidences a direct link 
between its metaphysical understanding of the gods, and its ap-
proach to morality and virtue. 
Unlike the Epicureans, the Stoics viewed their god as not only an 
arbiter of virtue, but as the standard for virtue itself.  See Long 
and Sedley, where Stobaeus is quoted: ―Zeno represented the 
end [of life] as: ‗living in agreement‘.  This is living in accordance 
with one concordant reason, since those who live in conflict are 
unhappy.  His successors expressed this in a more expanded 
form, ‗living in agreement with nature‘.‖  In other words, since 
god is equivalent to nature, the Stoics defined virtue as living in 
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agreement with nature – living in accordance with god‘s perfect 
conception of morality. 
 Because the Stoics believed there was an absolute stan-
dard for virtue – i.e. god – they believed that virtue was a princi-
ple never to be deviated from, which demanded perfection.  
Again, see a quote from Long and Sedley, this time from Seneca: 
―Therefore if every thing, when it has perfected its own good, is 
praiseworthy and has reached the end of its own nature, and 
man‘s own good is reason, if he has perfected reason, he is 
praiseworthy and has attained the end of his nature.  This perfect 
reason is called virtue and is identical to rectitude.‖  Virtue, then, 
is rationality – which, as we have seen earlier, takes its ultimate 
form in divinity.  And virtue is (in theory) perfectible – because it 
is derived from a perfect standard: god.  The Stoics advocated a 
life devoted to virtue, because they believed virtue had a nature 
independent of human circumstances, and thus that it was possi-
ble to devote oneself to following it consistently.  This belief, in 
turn, came from the Stoic conception of the gods.  The Stoics, like 
the Epicureans, were led necessarily from a view of the gods to a 
view of virtue. 
 A fascinating consequence of the view that these two Hel-
lenistic philosophies were integrated systems of thought is that 
this view allows a comparison between the two philosophies that 
indicates a kind of basic similarity.  Ultimately, both the Epicu-
rean system – the idea that virtue is bound to practicality, be-
cause there is no divine standard – and the Stoic system – the 
idea that virtue is the goal of life, because it is a divinely-
determined standard to which one can hold oneself – both of 
these are derived from another premise, a deeper one, which 
both philosophies share.  This is the premise that aside from god, 
there is no way to define virtue objectively – that human beings 
are not able to reach an absolute definition of virtue if that defini-
tion is not divinely mandated.  The Epicureans believe this.  They 
believe that because there is no divine mandate, virtue is naught 
but pragmatic convention.  The Stoics believe it.  They believe 
that they must act virtuously because there is a divine mandate – 
because a god has created nature in such a way as to demand it.  
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Neither philosophy holds that virtue can be defined in absolute 
terms if it is independent of god.  The historical progression of 
these early ties between virtue and divinity is a topic outside the 
scope of this paper.  However, noting the consistencies within 
two disparate philosophical systems allows this broader similar-
ity to emerge. 
 Stoicism and Epicureanism, if the study of relationships 
between metaphysics and ethics are any indication, are consis-
tent, integrated systems of thought, following an implicit model 
for philosophy as a unified whole of divergent branches.  That 
basic model constitutes a significant contribution of Greek 
thought to the study of philosophy. 
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